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OST states set maximum limits on interest rates which lenders may charge on residential mortgage loans. These usury laws are intended to protect borrowers from "exorbitant" interest rates which lenders might charge in the absence of such legal controls. Advocates of usury ceilings often express concern for borrowers who have little knowledge of prevailing interest rates or few alternative sources of credit. 1
In most states, usury ceilings on conventional residential mortgage loans are set at fixed levels by state laws. When market interest rates rise above the usury ceilings, many individuals cannot find lenders who will finance their home purchases. Also, during such periods residential construction declines relative to that in states not subject to such restrictive usury ceilings.
In recent years several states have raised their usury ceilings, eliminated usury ceilings entirely, or adopted floating ceilings which change periodical!>' as other interest rates change. Floating usury ceilings are intended to protect individual borrowers from unusually high interest rates, while avoiding disruptions in the credit flow to home buyers and reductions in residential construction which can result when market interest rates approach or exceed usury ceilings. This paper evaluates whether floating usury rate formulas recently adopted by various states will avoid impeding the flow of credit to home buyers.
Lenders typically make investments which, they hope, will maximize their profits. Consequently, they shift their assets among various investments in response to changes in relative rates of return, For instance, if yields on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds rise relative to yields on residential mortgages, lenders will reduce their mortgage investments and increase their holdings of government bonds. In so doing, they bring relative rates of return back in line.
In addition, lenders can choose to invest in residential mortgages on properties in different parts of the country. In the absence of usury ceilings, mortgage interest rates in any section of the country cannot deviate too much from the national average rate for long. Lenders will make more credit available in areas with relatively high jnterest rates.
Lenders usually are willing to make more risky mortgage loans if borrowers adequately compensate them for those risks by paying higher interest rates. This trade-off between risk and interest rates can be illustrated for the ratio of mortgage loan to house price, one aspect of risk. Since lenders assume ownership of mortgaged property if borrowers default on mortgage payments, the ratio of the loan to the market value of the house is an important consideration in evaluating risk. Lenders will make loans which are larger relative to the prices of homes being purchased if borrowers will pay sufficiently higher interest rates to compensate for the greater risks. Thus, lenders do not treat mortgage loans as a homogeneous type of asset; they attach various degrees of risk to individual loans, depending upon borrowers' personal circumstances, credit histories, and preference for loan terms. The nature of the properties to be mortgaged also affects risk, differing with the prospects for depreciation in market value.
These mortgage market characteristics indicate that in the absence of government-imposed interest rate ceilings:
The average level of interest rates on new resi dentin! mortgages will fluctuate with changes in other long-term interest rates, Interest rates on new residential mortgages will tend to be similar in different parts of the country, when adjusted for differences in the riskiness of loans, and (3) Interest rates on new residential mortgages will vary in a given area, depending upon risk characteristics.
As Chart I indicates, yields on conventional residential mortgages do change over time as changes in other long-term interest rates occur. The somewhat fixed differentials between these interest rates reflect the investors' perceptions of differential risks and transactions costs on these types of investments. 2
A recent study reports that the range of mortgage interest rates among metropolitan areas averages about 75 basis points. However, the study' also re-2 For evidence that lenders shift assets between residential mortgage loans and other long-term investments when relative interest rates change, see William L. Silber, Portfolio
Behavior of Financial Institutions (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Irc., 1970, pp. 18-56) . Silber found evidence of such behavior for mutual savings banks, pension plans, life insurance companies, and property and casualty insurance companies. lie did riot find evidence of such substitution among assets by commercial banks and savings and loan associations, Several studies find that, during a given period of time, the interest rates charged by mortgage lenders depend upon the risks and costs associated with individual loans. In general, mortgage interest rates tend to be higher on loans which are a larger percentage of the purchase price of the house, and lower on loans with longer maturities and for homes of higher dollar value.
4 One study also found that characteristics of the property influenced the mortgage interest rate, with a higher interest rate for a property in poorer physical condition or in a neighborhood with greater risk of depreciation in value. 5 Studies of delinquencies and defaults on residential mortgages indicate that lenders have a sound statistical basis for assigning different risks to mortgage loans, based upon characteristics of borrowers and loan terms. One study found the following factors positively related to incidence of delinquency (loans 90 days or more in arrears) in mortgage payments:
(1) Ratio of the loan to the purchase price of the house (2) Occupation of borrower, with delinquency lower for professionals, executives, and managers, and higher for salespersons (3) Number of dependents.°A nother study on defaults on FHA-insured home mortgages finds that the incidence of default is positively related to both maturity of loans and loan-tovalue ratios, and negatively related to borrowers' income. 7
A recent study by the U.S. League of Savings Associations indicates that the relatively young with moderate to low incomes are primarily the borrowers who buy their first homes with low percentage down payment loans (see Table I ). As indicated in the studies cited above, these are the borrowers most likely to become delinquent or default on their mortgage loans, and, consequently, they are charged higher mortgage interest rates.
as the dependent variable in regression analysis. The authors found that mortgage interest rates were positively related to the ratio of the amount of the loan to the appraisal value of the home to be purchased, and negatively related to maturity and dollar amount of the loan. The authors also found that characteristics of the property to be mortgaged influence the mortgage interest rate. Dummy variables for properties in neighborhoods with poorer prospects for appreciation in value and for properties in poorer physical condition had positive regression coefficients which were statistically significant. See Richard L. Sander and Howard E. In recent years several states have established usury ceilings which are automatically adjusted at frequent intervals to changes in other interest rates (see Table  II ). Floating ceilings are intended to avoid the harmful effects of fixed ceilings on home financing and residential construction, while still protecting borrowers from possible "exorbitant" interest rates. These floating usury ceilings are tied to various interest rates, the most common being yields on long-term U.S. Government bonds and the Federal Reserve discount rate.
:5-~-~~r/ One issue that concerns advocates of usury ceilings is whether lenders would always charge the maximum interest rate permissible on residential mortgages. Finance companies which make small loans to individuals often charge the maximum interest rates allowed by states and raise their loan rates whenever the usury limits are raised. Do lenders in the residential mortgage market respond similarly when floating usury ceilings rise?
Chart II provides evidence on this issue. Usury ceilings and average mortgage interest rates are plotted for five metropolitan areas in states which have had floating usury ceilings for several years.' 2
The chart for the Cleveland, Ohio, area requires special explanation, since average mortgage interest rates were above the usury ceiling during 1974-77. Savings and loan associations are exempt from the Ohio usury law, and, therefore, can make mortgage loans at interest rates above the usury ceiling. The same explanation applies to mortgage interest rates for Columbus, Ohio, in 1977, when the survey of mortgage interest rates began for that area. Since the second half of 1977, the usury ceiling has been above average mortgage interest rates, which indicates that the rates lenders charge are not determined by the ' 2 The mortgage interest rates are those on existing homes, which tend to be higher than mortgage rates on newly-built homes. Using the higher of these average interest rates is appropriate in determining whether lenders always charge interest rates equal to the legal maximums, because it intentionally biases the observations in the direction of finding such a pattern. Average mortgage interest rates for the Philadelphia area are based upon a high percentage of mortgage loans made by lenders outside of Pennsylvania. Theretore, observations are not presented for the Philadelphia area.
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floating usury ceiling. Average mortgage interest rates in Cleveland and in Columbus were approximately the same as the national average, both when mortgage rates in those two cities were above the usury ceiling and when they were below.
In the Chicago area, mortgage interest rates apparently were constrained lower than national average mortgage rates in the first half of 1974 by the 8 percent usury ceiling. Contract interest rates were equal to or below the usury ceiling, but effective interest rates were slightly higher due to initial fees. Since early 1975, average mortgage interest rates in the Chicago area have been below the state usury ceiling, following closely the national average mortgage interest rate.
Mortgage rates in Minneapolis were substantially below national average interest rates until early 1976, when the state usury rate was allowed to float at 2 percentage points above the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bills.' 3 Since then, average mortgage interest rates in the Minneapolis area have been below the usury ceiling and have followed the national average mortgage interest rate. The same pattern holds for Pittsburgh, with average mortgage interest rates in that area remaining substantially below the floating usury ceiling for Pennsylvania since 1977.
Use of a floating usury ceiling will avoid problems -in mortgage financing which occasionally result with fixed ceilings only if the floating rate remains above the mortgage interest rates that would prevail in the absence of usury ceilings, Relationships among interest rates vary over time, and, therefore, a floating usury rate which is currently above mortgage interest rates may be below in the future. Also, a floating ceiling which remains above national average mortgage rates may not be high enough to enable relatively high-risk borrowers to obtain funds.
The prospects for the various floating usury ceilings to remain above mortgage interest rates in the future can be assessed by examining past relationships between interest rates on conventional residential mort-13 For a few months in 1974 and 1975, average contract interest rates on conventional residential mortgages on existing homes in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area were above 8 percent. This is probably due to an exemption from the usury laws for loans of $100,000 or more, and loans by some national banks at 1 percentage point above the Federal Reserve discount rate, a permissible interest rate for national banks. The discount rate was above 7 percent during that period. 'I -1 to gages and interest rates to which the floating rates are tied. Most floating ceilings have been adopted only since 1974. Suppose, however, they had been in effect since 1983. Would the implied usury ceilings calculated from the floating rate formulas have been higher than the average interest rates on conventional residential mortgages since 1963?14 Results of comparisons of implied nsnry ceilings to mortgage interest rates are presented in the last three columns of Table II . The first of these columns gives the number of months since January 1963 when the implied floating usury ceilings are equal to or below the national average interest rate on conventional mortgages for newly-built homes. This table indicates that some states have set their floating usnry ceilings too low to avoid disruptions in the flow of credit to home buyers. These observations are especially pertinent for Vermont and West Virginia, which have set their floating rate formulas so low that the implied usury ceilings are below the national average interest rates on conventional mortgages for most months since 1963, 15 Restrictions on the speed with which floating usury rates are allowed to adjust to changes in market interest rates also create potential problems in home financing. Iowa restricts the speed of adjustment in its floating rate by setting its usury ceiling quarterly, at 2 percentage points above the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds. The implied usury rates calculated for Iowa are below the conventional mortgage interest rate for six months since 1963. If the floating ceiling rate for Iowa were set monthly instead of quarterly, the implied usury rate would have been below the national average mortgage rate for only one month since January 1963.
The floating usury rate formula recently adopted by New York state restricts the speed of adjustment 4 These comparisons may understate the effects of usury ceilings on the flow of credit to home buyers, since some of the mortgage interest rates incorporated in the national average rate were at times constrained by usury ceilings. One study reports that when interest rates are relatively low, the average mortgage interest rates in areas with relatively high usury ceilings are approximately equal to the national average rate, hut when interest rates are high, increases in the national average rate lag behind the increases in areas with relatively high usury ceilings. See McNulty, "A Reexaininat ioa of the Problem of State Usury Ceilings,' pp. 5-9. t5 Two other states with implied floating usury ceihngs which were below mortgage interest rates for a substantial number of months are North Dakota and Ohio. -However, those states make exceptimu for S&Ls. In North Dakota, S&Ls are subject to a 12 percent usury ceiling, and in Ohio, S&Ls are exempt from the usury ceiling. Therefore, the major effect of usury ceilings on residential mortgages in these states is to determine which financial institutions make mortgage loans during certain periods.
Page 18 APRIL 1979 to other interest rates even more than that of IosvaYŨ nder the New York law, the usury rate will be set quarterly at 2 percentage points above the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds, but increases in the usury rate from one quarter to the next may be no greater than 25 basis points. The implied usury rates based upon the New York specification are equal to or less than mortgage interest rates for nineteen months over the period since 1963, more than three times as often as for Iowa which does not limit the quarterly changes in its usury rate.
Minnesota has another type of restriction on the speed of adjustment of its usury ceiling. The floating ceiling is adjusted monthly to a level 2 percentage points above the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds, but rounded to the nearest 25 basis points. If, for instance, the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds is 8.12 percent, the usury ceiling in Minnesota is 10 percent; with a ten-year bond yield of 8.13 percent, the usury ceiling is 10.25 percent. Rounding to the nearest 25 basis points tends to delay the rise in the usury ceiling when long-term interest rates are rising, and to delay the decline in the usury ceiling when long-term rates are declining. Since January 1963, the implied usury ceiling for Minnesota is less than the national average mortgage interest rate for six months, whereas it would have been below for only one month without rounding to the nearest 25 basis points.
To some extent these restrictions on the speed of adjustment defeat the purpose for having a floating usury rate. The restrictions occasionally cause the implied floating usury rates for Iowa, Minnesota, and New York to be below mortgage interest rates when long-term interest rates are rising rapidly.
The relatively low usury ceiling in Ohio during 1976-77 illustrates the problem with tying a usury ceiling to the Federal Reserve discount rate. When Ohio initially adopted the floating usury ceiling in November 1975, the usury rate was increased 100 basis points to only 25 basis points below the national average mortgage interest rate. However, the gap between the usury rate and the national average mortgage rate began to widen almost immediately, as the Federal Reserve twice lowered the discount rate during 1976. Two major problems with tying usury ceilings on residential mortgage interest rates to the discount rate are these: 1) the Federal Reserve generally adjusts the discount rate to changes in shortterm market interest rates, whereas mortgages are 10 The New York usury ceiling on residential mortgages was recently raised to 9.50 percent, and beginning May 1, 1979, will be set quarterly according to a floating rate formula.
long-term investments, and there often are large gaps between short-term and long-term interest rates, and 2) at times, the discount rate, being set by administrative action and not by market forces, is allowed to remain out of line with other interest rates.
The potential for the floating usury rates to create mortgage financing problems for relatively high-risk borrowers can be assessed by adding 25 to 50 basis points to the average conventional mortgage rate on newly-built homes, and comparing that interest rate to the implied floating ceilings for each month since 1963. Two recent studies indicate that a state's usury ceiling must be at least 50 basis points above the national average mortgage interest rate in order to avoid impeding the flow of credit to relatively highrisk borrowers. 17
For several states, the floating usury rates are almost always above the average mortgage rate, but are below the average mortgage rate plus 25 basis points for a substantial number of months. Of course, the differences are even greater with 50 basis points added. The frequency with which implied usury ceilings are below the average mortgage interest rate plus 50 basis points is especially great for states with restrictions on the speed of adjustment of their floating rates. For instance, the average mortgage interest rate plus 50 basis points is above the implied usury rate for New York about 80 percent of the time since 1963, and above the implied usury ceiling in Minnesota about 65 percent of the time. Thus, floating usury ceilings in several states are likely to ration relatively high-risk borrowers out of the mortgage market much of the time. This is substantiated by a study of Minnesota's floating usury ceiling which reports that conventional mortgage loans in that state continue to have relatively high percentage down payments since the floating ceiling was adopted.' 8
In contrast, states with usury ceilings 2.50 percentage points above yields on long-term U.S. Government bonds, or 5 percentage points above the Federal Reserve discount rate, and no restrictions on the speed of response of usury ceilings to changes in tt One study finds that Georgia's usury ceiling begins to affect mortgage loan originations by savings and loan associations in Georgia when the market interest rate on mortgages rises to within 50 basis points of the usury ceiling. the interest rates to which they are tied, are almost always above the national average mortgage interest rate. This result holds even with additional basis points added to the average mortgage rate to allow for a risk premium for loans with higher-risk characteristics.
19 These appear to be the minimum differentials above the yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds and the Federal Reserve discount rate which are necessary to avoid impeding the flow of credit to home buyers.
Since fixed usury ceilings on residential mortgage interest rates, at times, have had adverse effects on home financing and residential construction, several states recently have adopted floating usury rates in an attempt to avoid these adverse effects when mortgage interest rates rise. These floating usury rates are increased or decreased in specified relationships to variou~other interest rates, the most common being yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds and the Federal Reserve discount rate.
Two issues are raised concerning the effects of the floating usury rates. The first is whether mortgage interest rates equal the floating usury ceilings. In general, average mortgage interest rates charged by lenders in areas subject to floating usury ceilings remain approximately equal to national average mortgage interest rates, not the floating usury ceilings.
The other issue is whether the floating usury rates adopted by various states have been set high enough to remain above national average interest rates on residential mortgages over time. Based upon past relationships between mortgage interest rates and the other interest rates to which the floating usury ceilings are tied, floating usury rates for a few states were below national average mortgage interest rates for substantial periods of time. Floating usury ceilings in several additional states are set so close to average mortgage interest rates that relatively high-risk borrowers will frequently be rationed out of the market for conventional residential mortgages. In contrast, states with usury rates set 2.50 percentage points above yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds or 5 percentage points above the Federal Reserve discount rate appear to have set their usury ceilings high enough to avoid impeding the flow of credit to home buyers.
'~Theresult also holds for Tennessee's recently adopted floating ceiling (effective May 1, 1979) set at 2 percentage points above the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) auction rate on conventional mortgages. The implied floating ceiling for Tennessee is above the conventional mortgage rate plus 50 basis points since 1972, when the FNMA series began.
